

Stefan Van Parys (NBB) Belgisch Instituut voor Overheidsfinanciën

23 November 2023




This presentation is based on Cornille D., M. Deroose, H. Godefroid, R. Schoonackers, P. Stinglhamber and S. Van Parys (2023) 'The impact of high inflation on Belgian public finances: a simulation exercise', NBB Economic Review 2023 (The impact of high inflation on Belgian public finances: a simulation exercise | nbb.be)

Inflation was historically high in 2022, driven by rising energy prices


Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)

(year-on year change, in %)



Decomposition of HICP


(Contributions in percentage points, HICP = year-on-year change, in %)







Conceptual framework for analysis of the impact of inflation on public finance





Our simulation set-up for analysing the impact of inflation on the budget balance

Shock identification:

- Simulation reference year = realisations of 2021
- To simulate an inflation shock, we compare the macro-economic framework of 2 different NBB projection vintages for the period 2022-2025
 - December 2021 NBB projections = December 2021 scenario
 - June 2023 NBB projections = June 2023 scenario
 - → Unexpected inflation shock = difference between price variables in December 2021 and June 2023
- 1) Analysing the automatic impact of inflation on the primary balance for 2022-2025:
- NBB budgetary projection framework is used
- Ceteris paribus approach: nominal evolution only driven by the growth rate of corresponding deflators
 - → Difference w.r.t. 2021 = Impact on primary balance of inflation for each scenario
 - → Difference between December 2021 and June 2023 = impact on primary balance of unexpected supply driven inflation shock
- 2) Analysing the impact on interest payments
- 3) Analysing the impact on economic activity


See later




Imported inflation leads to a decoupling of the NCPI and the GDP deflator

Price change

(year-on-year change, in %)



Price index level



National consumer price index (NCPI) - June 2023 scenario

GDP deflator - June 2023 scenario

National consumer price index (NCPI) - December 2021 scenario ---- GDP deflator - December 2021 scenario

Difference June 2023 scenario / December 2021 scenario (%)

Difference June 2023 scenario / December 2021 scenario (2021 = 100)


2019	2020	2021	2022e	2023e	2024e	2025e		2019	2020	2021	2022e	2023e	2024e	2025e
0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	2.6	2.3	0.0	NCPI	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	7.8	10.3	10.3
0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	3.9	2.2	0.0	GDP deflator	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	5.0	7.3	7.3
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A majority of revenue and primary expenditure items are indexed at a higher rate than the GDP deflator

Main revenue and expenditure items: deflator change between 2021 and 2025 (June 2023 scenario) (in %)






In the medium run, inflation is expected to have a negative direct impact on the primary balance

Impact on the primary balance in different inflation scenarios

(in % of GDP)




December 2021 scenario (w.r.t. 2021)

June 2023 scenario (w.r.t. 2021)

Impact on the primary balance of the unexpected inflation shock

(in % of GDP)




June 2023 scenario w.r.t. December 2021 scenario



The positive impact of inflation on primary expenditure exceeds its positive impact on revenue

Decomposition of the impact of the unexpected inflation shock on the primary balance

(in percentage points of GDP)




June 2023 scenario w.r.t. December 2021 scenario Contribution of:





The indexation of discretionarily indexed spending items matters a lot for the impact on the primary balance

Impact of unexpected inflation shock, alternative scenarios of discretionarily indexed spending items (in % of GDP)




- June 2023 scenario w.r.t. December 2021 scenario
- Full indexation scenario (w.r.t. December 2021 scenario)
- 2 % indexation scenario (w.r.t. December 2021 scenario)



The impact of inflation is close to neutral for Regions, Communities and local authorities, due to the automatic link of federal transfers to consumer prices

Impact of unexpected inflation shock on government's sub-entities




- June 2023 scenario w.r.t. December 2021 scenario
- Federal government and social security
- Regions, Communities and local authorities





The government adopted substantial measures to deal with the energy crisis, most of which were not targeted and many of which distorted the price signal





Interest rates and expectations increased significantly since the beginning of 2022

Interest rates developments




- Long term (10-year OLO, monthly average)
- ▲ December 2021 market expectations long term (10-year OLO)
- June 23 market expectations (10-year OLO)
- Short term (three-month treasury certificates monthly average)
- ECB desposit facility rate
- Implicit interest rate *



^{*} Ratio between interest charges in the current year and debt at the end of the preceding year.

Interest payments are expected to rise by on average 0.2 % of GDP per year

Interest payment developments




The scope for further reductions in interest payments was already narrowing significantly before the rise of interest rates





Real GDP projections between two BMPE rounds can be compared to roughly quantify the link between the inflation surprise and economic activity and, in turn, the impact on the budget balance






Source: NBB.

To what extent are GDP revisions related to the inflation shock?

Overall, the unexpected inflation surprise worsens the budget balance

Impact of the unexpected inflation shock on the budget balance


(in percentage points of GDP)







The debt ratio will drop in the short run but rise in the medium term, due to second-round effects stemming from the inflation surprise






Sensitivity of the debt ratio to real GDP assumptions

Debt ratio

(w.r.t. December 2021 scenario, in percentage points of GDP)








Conclusions


- According to simulations comparing the NBB's autumn forecast of December 2021 and June 2022, increased
 inflation is likely to have a substantial negative impact on Belgian public finances
- The inflation shock would structurally increase the budget deficit with some 1.4 % of GDP by 2025:
 - 0.5 % of GDP due to the automatic impact of inflation on primary spending and revenue items
 - The import-driven inflation shock is expected to lower corporate margins and hence corporate income taxes
 - The non-indexation of excise duties lowers revenues as a share of GDP
 - Partial indexation of discretionarily indexed spending items substantially lowers the impact
 - The unfavourable impact occurs almost entirely at the federal government level
 - 0.9 % of GDP due to rising interest rates. This rise will swell towards 2.2 % of GDP by 2031
- Inflation temporarily reduces the public debt ratio, though by 2031 the debt ratio could increase by some 10 % of GDP
 - If economic activity recovers fully compared to the level before the shock, this impact would be halved
 - The interest rate growth dynamics are likely to become less favourable in the medium run
- The simulation results are subject to considerable uncertainty, given that the macroeconomic projections on which they are based are highly uncertain





The origin of an inflation shock determines its relationship with real economic activity





Combination of supply and demand shock







Automatic impact of inflation on the **primary balance**

Primary expenditure

Capital spending

Other current transfers

Intermediate consumption

Health care

Pensions and other socia spending (excl. Health)

Compensation of employees

Automatically linked to inflation

Quasi-automatically linked to inflation

Most likely linked to inflation

Revenues

Excise duties

Other

Corporate income tax

VAT

Social security contributions

Personal income tax




Evolution below GDP deflator growth

Type of inflation shock matters:

Deflator of 'gross operating surplus' (≈ profits) depends on relative evolution between GDP deflator and production costs

 Negative supply shock: reduced margins because of incomplete pass-through of costs to prices

Corporate Income tax



 Positive demand shock: stable margins because growth in GDP deflator in line with production costs


Corporate Income tax

Expected less negative impact of inflation on primary balance





The indexation of social benefits is expected to outpace growth of the GDP deflator





The delayed indexation of personal income tax brackets has a temporarily beneficial effect on the budget balance

Impact of indexation of tax brackets based on national consumer price index (NCPI) of previous year (t-1) compared to hypothetical indexation based on NCPI of current year (t) (in % of GDP)

