






# Belgian public debt is overwhelmingly concentrated at the federal level




(share of entities in total final public spending in Belgium, 2021)



## The bulk of public debt is at the federal level

(share of entities in total public debt in Belgium, 2021)



FED: Federal government and social security

FLA: Flemish Community WAL: Walloon Region

BRU: Brussels-Capital Region and Common Community Commission

FRE: French Community

Other: (mainly) Local government



Sources: NAI, NBB.

# Sources of revenue and types of spending differ between government entities



(% of total, 2021)



Fiscal and parafiscal revenue

Non-fiscal and non-parafiscal revenue

Transfers received from other public administrations

### Government spending

(% of total, 2021)



Property income (interest charges)

Gross capital formation (investment)

Intermediate consumption

Employee compensation

Other transfers


Subsidies

Social benefits



Sources: NAI, NBB.

# Since the COVID-19 crisis, debt ratios have been rising but are not equally under control in all government entities




To increase comparability across entities, budget balance and debt are expressed **as a share of disposable revenue**, a proxy for their financial resources:  $Disposable \ revenue_{entity} = Revenue_{entity} - Transfers \ paid \ to \ other \ entities$ 

$$Disposable\ revenue_{entity} = Revenue_{entity} - Transfers\ paid\ to\ other\ entities$$
  $Revenue_{BE} = \sum_{entities} Disposable\ revenue_{entity}$ 



# The fiscal outlook at unchanged policy of the government entities is heterogeneous

(in € billion)






## Downward trend in transfers from the federal government to federated entities


(Special Finance Act)

### Incomplete linkage of transfers to GDP growth

(Grants, % of GDP)



### Increase of the contribution to cover pension liabilities (in € million)



## Phasing out of the transition mechanism

(in € million)



Brussels-Capital Region





# Medium term risks: assessing the sustainability of public finances under 4 alternative scenarios


	Baseline	Symmetric GDP scenario	Asymmetric GDP scenario	Interest rate scenario	Investment scenario
Belgian real GDP growth	Until 2027 projections FPB, afterwards Study Commission on Ageing	-0.25pp from 2023		=	Baseline nominal GDP growth + Δ inv
Regional real GDP growth	/	/	3 subscenarios -0.25ppt from 2023	/	/
Public investment exp.	Until 2027 projections FPB, afterwards inv-to- GDP ratio constant	=	=	=	investment-to-GDP ratio up from 3% in 2024 to 4% in 2030
Primary balance	Until 2027 projections FPB, afterwards pb-to- GDP ratio constant + ageing costs	+ impact Δ GDP	+ impact Δ regional GDP	=	+ impact Δ inv & Δ GDP
Interest charges	Own calculations: refinanced and new debt financed at market rates	=	=	+250 bp from 2023	=



# Primary deficits will continue to push up debt in the baseline scenario

## Drivers of the change in the debt ratio

(as a % of disposable revenue)




Sources: BISA, FPB, IWEPS, Statistics Flanders, NAI, NBB.

# An adverse national GDP shock worsens all debt paths significantly, while the impact of an adverse regional GDP shock is cushioned<sup>1,2</sup>


#### Symmetric GDP shock

(government debt as a % of disposable revenue)



#### Asymmetric GDP shock

(government debt as a % of disposable revenue)



Source: NBB

<sup>1</sup> The baseline scenario reflects the Federal Planning Bureau's 2022-2027 macroeconomic and fiscal projections, except for government interest payments which were calculated based on the implicit interest rates on debt and the market interest rates on Belgian government bonds over May 2022. Beyond 2027, macroeconomic projections were taken from the Study Committee on Ageing's 2022 Report. The primary balance-to-national GDP ratio was kept constant as from 2028, to which the cost impact of population ageing (as projected by the Study Committee on Ageing) was added. Stock-flow-adjustments were set to zero.


<sup>2</sup> The symmetric GDP shock scenario assumes that Belgian real GDP growth declines by 0.25 p.p. per year as from 2023 with the shock affecting all regions symmetrically. In contrast, the asymmetric GDP shock scenario assumes that regional real GDP growth declines by 0.25 p.p. per year as from 2023 with the shock hitting the three regions in turn. The primary balances are affected through entity-specific revenue and expenditure elasticities (GDP effect) and a related change in Special Financing Act transfers.



# A continued rise in interest rates will significantly raise public debt projections for all entities<sup>1</sup>


## 250 bp increase in interest rates as from 2023

(10y Belgian OLO rate, %)



#### Risk premium shock

(government debt as a % of disposable revenue)



Source: NBB.




<sup>1</sup> The baseline scenario reflects the Federal Planning Bureau's 2022-2027 macroeconomic and fiscal projections, except for government interest payments which were calculated based on the implicit interest rates on debt and the market interest rates on Belgian government bonds over May 2022. Beyond 2027, macroeconomic projections were taken from the Study Committee on Ageing's 2022 Report. The primary balance-to-national GDP ratio was kept constant as from 2028, to which the cost impact of population ageing (as projected by the Study Committee on Ageing) was added. Stock-flow-adjustments were set to zero.

# The increase in debt due to additional public investment expenditure is initially softened by the improvement in Belgian GDP<sup>1,2</sup>


#### Public investment expenditure


(as a % of baseline disposable revenue)



#### Investment shock

(government debt as a % disposable revenue)





Source: NBB.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The investment scenario assumes that public investment expenditure increases from 3% of GDP in 2024 to 4% in 2030. The short-and long-term investment multiplier equals one. The primary balances are affected through the increase in public investment expenditure, entity-specific revenue and expenditure elasticities (GDP effect) and a related change in Special Financing Act transfers.



The baseline scenario reflects the Federal Planning Bureau's 2022-2027 macroeconomic and fiscal projections, except for government interest payments which were calculated based on the implicit interest rates on debt and the market interest rates on Belgian government bonds over May 2022. Beyond 2027, macroeconomic projections were taken from the Study Committee on Ageing's 2022 Report. The primary balance-to-national GDP ratio was kept constant as from 2028, to which the cost impact of population ageing (as projected by the Study Committee on Ageing) was added. Stock-flow-adjustments were set to zero.

# Short term risks: gross financing needs differ across government entities

(as a % of disposable revenue)





# Except for the Flemish Region, the debt ratings of the regions and communities in Belgium are less favourable than those of the federal government


### Long-term rating

(based on latest available evolution for each sub-sector)

	Fitch Ratings		Moody's		Standard & Poors	
	Short- term	Long- term	Short- term	Long- term	Short- term	Long- term
Optimal security	F1+	AAA	P-1	AAA	A-1+	AAA
Good quality at lower average quality		AA+		AA1		AA+
		AA		AA2		AA
		AA-		AA3		AA-
	F1	A+		A1	A-1	A+
		A		A2		A
	F2	A-	P-2	A3	A-2	Α-
		888+		BAA1		888+
	F3	888	P-3	BAA2	A-3	888+
		B88-		BAA3		888-
Speculative	8	BB+	NOT	BAI	8	BB+
		88	PRIME	BA2		88
		BB-		BA3		BB-
		B+		B1		B+
		В		B2		В
		B-		B3		B-
Extremely speculative				CAA	C	CCC+
	C	CCC		CA		CCC+
				C		CCC-
In default		DDD		1		D
		DD				
		D				
	BRU	FRE		1 W	FLA	FED


Stable perspective for all sub-sectors, except BRU (negative)





# Long term risks: ageing costs are mainly situated at the federal level


(change in social benefits in percentage points of GDP compared to 2019)







# Federal government has highest debt ratio but also highest degree of revenue autonomy






Sources: BISA, FPB, IWEPS, NAI, Statistics Flanders and NBB.

Note that "own revenue" equals total government revenue less transfers received from the government, imputed social security contributions and production for own final use.

## How to distribute a 100% debt-to-GDP norm for Belgium? A possible avenue


## Distribution of a 100% debtto-GDP norm for Belgium

(distribution key: share in 2016 own revenue)




## Debt norm

(in % of 2016 own revenue)



## Distance to debt target


(in % of disposable revenue)






## Fiscal effort required to stabilize Belgian public debt at 100% of GDP by 2041

## Distance to budget balance target



Budget balance required to stabilize Belgian public debt at 100% of GDP (or 204% of disposable revenue by 2041)

# Distance to budget balance target in 2031 (in € billion)







## Conclusion

- Public debt has risen substantially in all government entities in recent years
- At unchanged policy, debt dynamics are not under control in the medium run, except in FLA
- Transfers from the federal government to the regions and communities are growing slower than GDP 

  ⇒ regions and communities need to keep their primary expenditures in check to reduce budget deficits
- A decline in Belgian GDP growth will increase the debt ratio more in entities with higher debt levels (FED, WAL, BRU)
- A decline in regional GDP growth will have a more limited impact on regional debt ratio's due to the solidarity embedded in the Special Financing Act
- An interest rate shock will again be most damaging to those entities with the highest debt ratios (FED, WAL, BRU)
- Debt-financed public investment should be highly productive, with fiscal multipliers far above one, so as not to enhance debt sustainability risks
- Regions and communities face less favourable ratings and financing conditions than the federal government, except for FLA
- · Ageing costs considerably increase the federal government's long term sustainability risks
- Substantial consolidation efforts are needed to only bring the Belgian debt ratio down to 100% of GDP







# Primary deficit is projected to increase primarily driven by current expenditure

### FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY

#### Primary balance

(in € billion)



2016 primary balance,

---- constant relative to nominal

potential GDP

#### Revenue

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)



Fiscal and parafiscal

Non-fiscal and non-parafiscal

Transfers from other public administrations

### Primary expenditure

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)



Capital

Transfers to other public administrations



# Primary deficit is projected to disappear gradually under the impulse of a lower growth in primary expenditure than revenue

### **FLEMISH COMMUNITY**

## Primary balance (in € billion)



2016 primary balance,

---- constant relative to nominal

potential GDP



(deviation from the trend based on

nominal potential GDP since 2016,

#### — Total

Revenue

in € billion)

Fiscal and parafiscal

Non-fiscal and non-parafiscal

Transfers from other public administrations

#### Primary expenditure

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)





Current


Capital

Transfers to other public administrations



## Primary deficit is projected to decrease at first, and then to stabilize as revenue and primary expenditure would expand at a similar pace

## **BRUSSELS CAPITAL REGION AND COMMON COMMUNITY COMMISSION**





Sources: BISA, FPB, IWEPS, Statistics Flanders, NAI, NBB.

# Deficit reduction gradual and incomplete as revenue remains lower than primary expenditure

### **WALLOON REGION**

### Primary balance


(in € billion)

#### Revenue

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)

#### Primary expenditure

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)





## A persistent deficit is expected in the coming years as revenue and primary expenditures are expected to decline at a similar pace


### **FRENCH COMMUNITY**





#### Revenue

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)



#### Primary expenditure

(deviation from the trend based on nominal potential GDP since 2016, in € billion)





2016 primary balance, --- constant relative to nominal

potential GDP

 Fiscal and parafiscal Non-fiscal and non-parafiscal

> Transfers from other public administrations

Transfers to other public administrations

